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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Give me your tired, your poor,  
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,  
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.   
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,  
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”1 
 
Lady Liberty’s proclamation has, for years, signaled the United 
States’ welcoming attitude towards immigrant populations.  This 
welcoming decree, however, stands in sharp contrast with the harsh 
realities faced by unaccompanied alien children in the U.S. 
immigration system. 
Unaccompanied alien children face severe and permanent 
penalties in the U.S. immigration system for falsely claiming 
citizenship.2  For such minors, the golden door to legal 
immigration into the United States may be forever closed for 
mistakes made while U.S. law considered them children. 
This note addresses the legal capacity of unaccompanied alien 
children to make a false claim to U.S. citizenship under section 
212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).3  
 
 1. Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (1883), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6359435. 
 2. See infra Part III (discussing permanent inadmissibility stemming from 
falsely claiming citizenship). 
 3.  Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) (2006) [hereinafter INA].  Many of the justifications for 
2
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First, this note will explain important INA definitions and concepts 
critical to understanding the full weight of the false claims 
provision.4  Second, it will outline the history of the INA and some 
notable amendments.5  Third, it will address Minnesota’s recent 
encounter with the false claims provision by outlining a case 
pending at the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.6  Fourth, it will 
explore various provisions of the INA and agency regulations that 
support a categorical rule excluding unaccompanied alien children 
from section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii).7  Fifth, it will rely on the United 
States’ long tradition of distinguishing between minor and adult 
offenders in the criminal context to justify such a distinction in 
immigration law.8  Sixth, it will present policy reasons for 
concluding unaccompanied alien children lack legal capacity to 
falsely claim U.S. citizenship.9  Finally, it will propose potential 
options for shielding unaccompanied alien children from the 
severe consequences of the false claims provision.10 
II. KEY TERMINOLOGY IN THE IMMIGRAITON AND NATIONALITY ACT 
This section explains important statutory definitions and 
concepts helpful to understanding the INA and false claims 
provision. 
All noncitizens are considered “aliens” under the INA.11  
 
exempting unaccompanied alien children from section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) apply to 
all minor aliens.  This note, however, will focus exclusively on the need to exclude 
unaccompanied alien children as immigration law takes their unaccompanied 
status into account in a variety of other provisions and regulations.  See infra Part V. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. See infra Part IV. 
 7. See infra Part V.A. 
 8. See infra Part V.B. 
 9. See infra Part VI. 
 10. See infra Part VII. 
 11. INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006).  It is important to note 
that, under the INA, there is a rare group of individuals who are considered 
neither “citizens” nor “aliens.”  People falling into this group are considered 
“nationals” of the United States.  See INA § 101(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22).  
Although all “citizens” are considered “nationals,” not all “nationals” are 
considered “citizens.”  Id.  However, instances where an individual can properly be 
designated a “national” and not a “citizen” are very rare.  See Certificates of Non 
Citizen Nationality, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
http://travel.state.gov/law/citizenship/citizenship_781.html (last visited Mar. 13, 
2011).  As a result, the distinction between “citizen” and “noncitizen national” is 
immaterial for purposes of this note. 
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Within the category of “alien,” “immigrant”12 refers to all aliens 
except those falling within specified categories of “nonimmigrant 
aliens.”13  Nonimmigrant aliens, for example, include ambassadors, 
diplomats, temporary students, and foreign government officials.14  
The immigrant-nonimmigrant alien distinction is important in the 
context of discretionary waivers discussed in Part III.15 
The INA defines “child” as an unmarried individual under the 
age of twenty-one for the purposes of family-based petitions.16  The 
INA primarily defines “child” in reference to the “parent.”17  It 
should be noted that the statute and the implementing agencies 
 
 12. INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. § (a)(15)(A)–(V) (outlining the categories of nonimmigrant 
aliens).  A common factor among the nonimmigrant alien categories is the 
requirement that the alien have no intention to abandon the foreign residence at 
the time of entry.  See id. 
 15. See infra Part III and notes 61–62. 
 16. INA § 101(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1).  The INA treats “children” 
primarily as subsets of their parents for the purpose of obtaining immigration 
benefits.  The “child” exists only in relation to a parent.  This parent-child 
relationship forms the bedrock of determining who may immigrate as an 
immediate relative.  David B. Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-
Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1180–82 (2006) [hereinafter Thronson, 
Choiceless Choices] (describing the role of the parent-child relationship in 
immigration law).  The INA’s treatment of children leads to a structural 
imbalance.  See id. at 1186.  Children cannot petition for themselves; their status 
depends on their parents’ status.  Id. at 1181.  This dependency is one way, 
however, as children cannot file applications for their parents until reaching age 
twenty-one.  See Faustino v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 302 F. Supp. 212 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (rejecting child petitioner’s attack on the constitutionality of the 
INA based on her inability to file a valid petition for her father). 
 17. See David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of 
Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 991 (2002) 
[hereinafter Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids] (explaining that immigration law “does 
not conceive of a ‘child’ existing outside this relationship”).  Unaccompanied 
alien children do not fit neatly within the INA’s parent-child framework.  Id. at 
998–99.  Without the requisite parent, unaccompanied alien children are not 
afforded “child” status.  Without another alternative, unaccompanied alien 
children are often treated as adults by default and lack options tailored to their 
unique position.  Thronson, Choiceless Choices, supra note 16, at 1186–87 (outlining 
immigration law’s inflexible response to minors who fall outside the traditional 
family-related framework); Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids, supra at 997 
(“[I]mmigration law provides no alternative and simply treats unaccompanied 
children as adults by default.”).  Thus, in most cases “the forms of relief available 
to children are . . . identical to those available to adults.”  Devon A. Corneal, On the 
Way to Grandmother’s House: Is U.S. Immigration Policy More Dangerous than the Big Bad 
Wolf for Unaccompanied Juvenile Aliens?, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 609, 625 (2004) 
(exploring the forms of relief available to minors facing deportation). 
4
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use somewhat inconsistent terminology to refer to individuals 
under eighteen years old.  The term “juvenile” is defined as 
someone under age eighteen.18  “Minor,” however, is not defined in 
the INA.  Nonetheless, “juvenile” and “minor” appear to be used 
interchangeably.19  “Unaccompanied alien child” is defined 
elsewhere in the U.S. Code as a child: under the age of eighteen; 
without legal immigration status; and who lacks a parent or 
guardian.20  To add to the confusion, a “special immigrant juvenile” 
(SIJ) is an alien under twenty-one years old who has been deemed a 
dependent of the state by a juvenile court.21 
This note will use the term “minor” when referencing all aliens 
under age eighteen and “unaccompanied alien children” for 
individuals meeting the definition outlined above.  The term 
“juvenile” will be used to reference the same group of aliens but in 
the juvenile and criminal court settings. 
 
 
 
 
 18. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.3 (2010). 
 19. Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004).  The 
agency also attempts to distinguish between minors under age fourteen and those 
age fourteen to seventeen.  See id. (rejecting the Board of Immigration’s (BIA) 
reliance on the provision requiring notice to the authorized adult only in the case 
of minors under the age of fourteen); 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c)(2)(ii) (“[I]n the case of 
a minor under 14 years of age, service shall be made upon the person with whom 
the . . . minor resides . . . .”). 
 20. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2006).  The Senate proposed adding this 
definition to the INA in the Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2007.  
See S. 844, 110th Cong. § 235(g) (2007).  While not officially defined in the INA, 
various policies and subsequent congressional acts have incorporated the 
Homeland Security Act’s definition of unaccompanied alien child.  See, e.g., 
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5081 (2008) [hereinafter TVPRA] 
(incorporating by reference the definition of “unaccompanied alien child”); 
Memorandum from Joseph E. Langlois, Chief, United States Citizenship & 
Immigration Servs. Asylum Div., to All Asylum Office Staff (March 25, 2009), 2009 
WL 1102788 [hereinafter USCIS Asylum Division Memorandum] (outlining 
procedures for handling cases filed by unaccompanied alien children); 
Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, Office of the 
Chief Immigration Judge, to Immigration Judges, Court Administrators, Judicial 
Law Clerks, and Immigration Court Staff (Sept. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Office of 
the Chief Immigration Judge Memorandum], available at http://www.nlada.org
/Training/Train_Civil/Equal_Justice/2007_Materials/109_2007_Kerwin_handout
5 (providing guidance for adjudicating cases involving unaccompanied alien 
children). 
 21. INA § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). 
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At the heart of the INA are provisions governing 
inadmissibility and deportability.22  Inadmissibility and deportability 
grounds are separated by whether a noncitizen has been admitted 
to the United States.23  “Admission” refers to whether an alien has 
lawfully entered the country after inspection by an immigration 
official.24  Aliens seeking admission into the country are subject to 
the grounds of inadmissibility.25  Aliens may be inadmissible for 
actions such as crimes, fraud, terrorist activity, and falsely claiming 
to be U.S. citizens.26 
Most grounds of inadmissibility have corresponding grounds 
of deportability that apply to noncitizens who have been legally 
admitted into the United States.27  Admitted aliens may be 
deportable for violating their immigration status or for being 
inadmissible at the time of entry.28  Deportable aliens have 
historically been afforded more constitutional protections than 
inadmissible aliens.29 
 
 22. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (grounds of inadmissibility); INA § 237, 8 
U.S.C. § 1227 (grounds of deportability). 
 23. Compare INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (inadmissible aliens who are 
ineligible to be admitted to the United States) (emphasis added), with INA § 237(a), 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a) (categories of deportable aliens who have been admitted to the 
United States) (emphasis added). 
 24. INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).  Prior to 1996, the 
defining act was physical entry into the United States.  See THOMAS ALEXANDER 
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 508 (5th ed. 
2003).  When applying the admission framework to noncitizens in the country 
without authorization, a legal fiction arises: despite being physically present, they 
are considered to be standing, for legal purposes, at the border seeking admission.  
See id. (explaining how after the 1996 reforms undocumented aliens within the 
U.S. border no longer have an advantage over aliens seeking admission at the 
border). 
 25. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182.  Aliens bear the burden of establishing 
that they are “clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and [that they are] 
not inadmissible.”  Matovski v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 722, 738 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(b)). 
 26. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
 27. INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227.  The INA includes language of deportability 
and removability.  Both terms reference the expulsion of aliens from the country.  
See id. (governing grounds of deportability); INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a 
(governing removal proceedings).  This note will follow the statutory language 
and use “deportability” in reference to grounds of deportability and “removability” 
in the context of removal proceedings. 
 28. INA § 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1). 
 29. Compare United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 
(1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as 
far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”), with Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 
U.S. 590, 598 n.5 (1953) (“The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien 
6
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After admission, noncitizens may apply for adjustment of status 
to become legal permanent residents (LPR).30  A key component of 
the adjustment process is that the alien must be “eligible to receive 
an immigrant visa and . . . admissible.”31  If an applicant is 
permanently inadmissible, as in the case of the false claims 
provision, adjustment of status is permanently barred.32  Thus, in 
the Minnesota case discussed below, the respondent’s permanent 
inadmissibility due to the false claim of citizenship permanently 
bars adjustment of status, despite the availability of an immediate 
visa through a U.S. citizen spouse.33 
The INA contains two mechanisms for expelling aliens from 
the country.  First, aliens may be placed in removal proceedings.34  
Removal proceedings take place before an immigration judge who 
may grant relief or order the alien removed from the United 
States.35  Inadmissible and deportable aliens may be placed in 
removal proceedings.36  Second, aliens may be subjected to 
expedited removal.37  Expedited removal, unlike removal 
proceedings, applies only to arriving aliens who have not been 
admitted.38  After determining the alien is inadmissible under 
section 212(a)(6)(C)—the false claims provision—the officer “shall 
order the alien [expeditiously] removed from the United States 
without further hearing or review . . . .”39 
 
seeking admission for the first time to these shores.  But once an alien lawfully 
enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution to all people within our borders.”). 
 30. See INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255. 
 31. Id. at (a). 
 32. See INA § 212(a)(8)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(8)(A) (aliens permanently 
ineligible to citizenship are inadmissible); see also INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) 
(requiring aliens to be eligible to receive a visa and admissible for permanent 
residence). 
 33. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 34. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. 
 35. Id.; see INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (cancellation of removal); INA § 
240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (voluntary departure). 
 36. INA § 240(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(2). 
 37. INA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1225. 
 38. Id. 
 39. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (“If an immigration 
officer determines that an alien (other than an alien described in subparagraph 
(F)) who is arriving in the United States or is described in clause (iii) is 
inadmissible under [sections 1182(a)(6)(C) or 1182(a)(7) of this title], the officer 
shall order the alien removed from the United States without further hearing or 
review . . . .”). 
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III. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE FALSE CLAIMS PROVISION 
A. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, also 
known as the McCarren-Walter Act,40 was the first major 
codification of comprehensive immigration laws for the United 
States.41  The INA established the provisions governing, among 
many topics, inadmissibility and deportability of aliens.42  The INA 
is reflective in its structure, with all of the grounds of inadmissibility 
appearing in the grounds of deportability.43 
The original INA contained the precursor to the false claims 
provision.44  This provision makes aliens who have misrepresented 
themselves as U.S. citizens for the purpose of obtaining an 
immigration benefit inadmissible.45  Under this provision, the false 
statement has to be made with the goal of obtaining an 
immigration-related benefit such as a visa, passport, or other 
immigration document.46  Additionally, the misrepresentation has 
to be made to a government official for the alien to be considered 
inadmissible under the INA.47  Thus, aliens claiming to be citizens 
on employment applications, for example, would not have made a 
 
 40. McCarran-Walter Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 182 (1952); NANCY 
HUMEL MONTWIELER, THE IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW OF 1986, at 3 (1987). 
 41. HUMEL MONTWIELER, supra note 40.  While various iterations of 
immigration laws preceded the 1952 act, it represented the “first piece of 
legislation to include all aspects of immigration policy, including naturalization, in 
one statute.”  AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION 
FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:3 (4th ed. 2010). 
 42. INA § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101.  The McCarren-Walter Act introduced the 
preference system for relatives and skilled workers and continued the quota system 
used since the 1920s.  HUMEL MONTWIELER, supra note 40.  The 1952 version was 
significant in that it was the first time all aspects of immigration policy were 
embodied in one statute.  FRAGOMEN, JR. & BELL, supra note 41. 
 43. See INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (governing grounds of inadmissibility); 
INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (governing grounds of deportability).  One ground of 
deportability includes being inadmissible at the time of entry.  See INA § 
237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A). 
 44. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 182.  The original misrepresentation 
provision was codified as section 212(a)(19) in the INA.  See id. 
 45. INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). 
 46. Id. (“Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, 
seeks to procure . . . a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United 
States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.”). 
 47. See 5 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 63.07 
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2008) (explaining a false claim to citizenship need not 
be made to a government official like the misrepresentation ground requires). 
8
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misrepresentation under INA section 212(a)(6)(i).48 
B. Notable Amendments to the INA 
The INA has seen various amendments since its 1952 
enactment.49  The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 
1986 warrants mention as it demonstrated Congress’ increasing 
concern over illegal immigration.50  The Act included employer 
sanctions in an effort to curb the hiring of undocumented 
workers.51  Congress’ effort to mitigate “out of control”52 illegal 
immigration paved the way for some of the most restrictive 
measures in the INA’s history.53 
In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), a bill aimed at combating 
illegal immigration trends.54  IIRIRA provisions are scattered 
 
 48. See In re John Doe, 2007 WL 5326372 (Admin. App. Office June 1, 2007) 
(reaffirming the BIA’s position that using fraudulent documents to secure 
employment is not a benefit under the INA); see also INS MEMORANDA: INS ON 
FALSE CLAIMS TO CITIZENSHIP, in 3 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 425 (1998) (explaining 
that the misrepresentation provision requires misrepresentation for purposes of 
obtaining a specific benefit under the INA such as a passport, visa, or passport). 
 49. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965); Act of Oct. 
20, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (1976); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. 
L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).  The 1990 Act revamped nearly every provision 
of the 1952 statute.  FRAGOMEN, JR. & BELL, supra note 41, § 3:1:2.  The Act 
amended and added provisions for deportation procedures, expanding the 
grounds applicable to aliens involved in criminal activities.  Id.  In response to the 
2001 terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
(USA PATRIOT Act).  Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); FRAGOMEN, JR. & BELL, 
supra note 41, at § 1:3:4. 
 50. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 
Stat. 3359 (1986); HUMEL MONTWIELER, supra note 40, at 4. 
 51. Immigration Reform and Control Act § 274A (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006)); see HUMEL MONTWIELER, supra note 40, at 31. 
 52. S. REP. NO. 99-132, at 3 (1985). 
 53. See 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 12 (2010); Charles C. Foster, 1996 
Immigration Act: Its Impact on U.S. Legal Residents and Undocumented Aliens, 34 HOUS. 
LAW. 28 (1997); President Signs Immigration Overhaul Measures, 73 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1317 (1996). 
 54. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET 
AL., 1 IMMIGRATION LAW & BUSINESS § 1.9 (2010).  In a subcommittee hearing on 
the shortcomings of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), a former INS General Counsel testified that the “one 
size fits all” approach tends to treat law-abiding immigrants the same as criminals.  
He also criticized the new grounds of inadmissibility which leave many otherwise 
eligible immigrants stranded in unlawful status.  Shortfalls of the 1996 Immigration 
Reform Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. Citizenship, Refugees, Border 
9
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throughout the INA and amend nearly every provision.55  IIRIRA 
included strict measures that expanded the grounds of 
inadmissibility and deportability while decreasing the availability of 
discretionary relief and judicial review.56 
Among the 1996 additions was the ground of inadmissibility 
for falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen.57  The Act added section 
212(a)(6)(C)(ii) to the INA.58  The provision reads, “Any alien who 
falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to 
be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under 
this Act . . . or any other Federal or State law is inadmissible.”59  
After 1996, a false claim could be made to any private person with 
authority to inquire into the alien’s nationality, such as an 
employer.60 
 
Security, and Int’l Law, 110th Cong. 29-30 (2007) [hereinafter Shortfalls of the 1996 
Legislation] (statement of Paul Virtue, former INS General Counsel and Executive 
Associate Comm’r). 
 55. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–10; Shortfalls of the 1996 Legislation, 
supra note 54, at 27 (testifying that the IIRIRA amended almost every section of 
Title II of the INA). 
 56. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 54, at § 5:12.  This “failure to look at the 
totality of the circumstances, to exercise discretion and compassion where 
warranted, and to evaluate each case on the merits, reflects a failure in our 
system.”  Shortfalls of the 1996 Legislation, supra note 54, at 30. 
 57. INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) (2006).  False claims 
to U.S. citizenship appear in two other contexts.  First, the INA has a 
corresponding ground of deportability for falsely claiming to be a citizen.  INA § 
237(a)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D).  Second, falsely claiming to be a citizen 
carries a criminal penalty, with the potential of being fined and/or imprisoned.  
18 U.S.C. § 911 (2006) (“Whoever falsely and willfully represents himself to be a 
citizen of the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than three years, or both.”).  See United States v. Clark, 316 F.3d 210, 213 (3d Cir. 
2003) (finding the use of a false birth certificate to obtain a state identification 
card constitutes a false claim in violation of the criminal provision). 
 58. See Pub. L. No. 104-208.  The amendment containing the false claims 
provision, known as the Simpson Amendment, was designed to discourage legal 
permanent residents and undocumented aliens from claiming to be citizens.  142 
CONG. REC. S4017 (1996).  Senator Simpson claimed the proposed amendment 
would deter such behavior because the risks of claiming citizenship would be too 
high.  Id.  The amendment also sought to deter undocumented aliens from 
seeking work in the United States.  Id. 
 59. INA § 212(a)(6)(c)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182.  Courts have found the “any 
purpose or benefit” requirement to include falsely claiming citizenship in a broad 
variety of settings.  See Ferrans v. Holder, 612 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming 
denial of petitioner’s application for adjustment of status based on his false claim 
to citizenship on an Employment Eligibility Verification Form); Estevez v. Attorney 
Gen. of U.S., 307 F. App’x 694 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 60. 3C AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 2710 (2010).  Various forms of 
documents may be sufficient to find that an alien has falsely claimed to be a U.S. 
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In enacting section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), Congress did not create 
a waiver of this ground of inadmissibility for aliens.61  The 
discretionary waiver for section 212(a)(6)(C) has been applied only 
to the misrepresentation provision under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i).62  
The 1996 provision effectively created a permanent statutory bar to 
citizenship, with a few exceptions,63 for aliens found inadmissible 
for making a false claim to citizenship.64 
Congress enacted a narrow exception to the inadmissibility of 
aliens falsely claiming citizenship in the Child Citizenship Act 
(CCA) of 2000.65  In addition to revising how children born outside 
the country acquire U.S. citizenship,66 the CCA provides protection 
from a finding of bad moral character,67 unlawful voting charges,68 
 
citizen.  See generally Ateka v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2004) (denying 
defendant’s petition for review of the BIA’s order of removal for defendant who 
indicated he was a U.S. citizen on an employment eligibility form); United States v. 
Clark, 316 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that defendant’s use of a 
counterfeit birth certificate constituted a false claim to citizenship).  But cf. Falsely 
Claiming to Be U.S. National Does Not Bar Adjustment of Status, BIA Rules, 84 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1088 (2007) (discussing BIA case in which the BIA found 
no error in the immigration judge’s grant of adjustment of status based on 
respondent’s false claim to being a U.S. national). 
 61. GORDON ET AL., supra note 47.  See In re Odwora, A097-672-154, 2008 
Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 6635 (concluding that no waiver is available for false claims to 
citizenship and applicant is barred from adjusting status); Theodros v. Gonzales, 
490 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining that unlike the crime involving 
moral turpitude (CIMT) provision, no waiver is available for falsely claiming U.S. 
citizenship); Paz v. Gonzales, 140 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that 
212(i) waiver applies only to 212(a)(6)(i) misrepresentations).  While immigrants 
who falsely claim to be U.S. citizens are permanently barred from adjusting status, 
non-immigrants may seek a discretionary waiver of such a claim.  INA § 
212(d)(3)(A) or (B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182; 3 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL., supra note 48, at 
425. 
 62. Paz, 140 F. App’x, at 752. 
 63. See INA § 245(h)(2)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (exempting special immigrants 
as defined in INA § 101(a)(27)(J) from § 212(a)(6)(C)); INA § 101(A)(15)(U); 
INA § 209(c) (authorizing waiver for humanitarian purposes, family unity, or if 
otherwise in the public interest). 
 64. The permanent ineligibility from falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen per 
section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) stems from never being able to adjust status to 
permanent residence under 8 U.S.C. § 1255.  The Attorney General has the 
discretionary power to allow an alien to adjust to legal permanent residents (LPR) 
status if, among other qualifications, the alien is “eligible to receive an immigrant 
visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1255. 
 65. Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (2000). 
 66. Id. § 101–02. 
 67. Id. § 201(a). 
 68. Id. § 201(b)(1). 
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and allegations of falsely claiming citizenship if certain criteria are 
met.69  First, each natural or adoptive parent of the child must be a 
citizen of the United States, either by birth or naturalization.70  
Second, the alien must have permanently resided in the United 
States prior to attaining age sixteen.71  Finally, the alien must have 
reasonably believed he or she was a U.S. citizen when committing 
the prohibited act, such as voting or claiming to be a U.S. citizen.72 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 officially abolished the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and transferred 
most of its functions to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).73  Responsibility for care of unaccompanied alien children 
in detention, however, transferred to the Office of Refugee 
Resettlement (ORR).74  ORR is charged with ensuring that the 
interests of minors are considered in policies relating to the care 
and detention of unaccompanied alien children.75 
C. Notable Proposed Amednments to the INA 
In 2005, the Senate passed the Unaccompanied Alien Child 
Protection Act (UACPA).76  The Act focused on some of the issues 
surrounding the detention and care of unaccompanied alien 
children.  The Act included provisions on custody and release of 
unaccompanied alien children, access to guardians ad litem, and 
measures strengthening protections of unaccompanied alien 
children.77  The UACPA asserts the government has a “fundamental 
responsibility to protect unaccompanied children in its custody.”78 
 
 69. Id. § 201(b)(2). 
 70. Id. § 201(b)(2) (amending INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 
(2002) (mostly codified in 6 U.S.C. § 101); U.S. CITIZENSHIP & NATURALIZATION 
HANDBOOK § 1:9 (2010). 
 74. The Act prohibited the executive department from combining the two 
branches or in any way consolidating their functions.  U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at § 1:9.  This separation ended the 
contradictory function the INS served as both caretaker and jailer.  Id. 
 75. 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2006). 
 76. S. 119, 109th Cong. (2005).  Representative Lofgren (CA-16) introduced 
the bill in the House in 2005.  H.R. 1172, 109th Cong. (2005).  The bill was 
referred to the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims one 
month later.  The bill died in committee.  Id. 
 77. See S. 119, 109th Cong. 
 78. Lara Yoder Nafziger, Protection or Persecution?: The Detention of 
Unaccompanied Immigrant Children in the United States, 28 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 
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Most recently, Congress addressed the proposed Development, 
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010 (DREAM Act).79  
The DREAM Act would have afforded a path to permanent 
residence in the United States for certain aliens who entered the 
country as children and fulfilled certain educational 
requirements.80  While the measure passed the House, it failed to 
garner enough votes to invoke cloture to reach a vote in the 
Senate.81  Nonetheless, future passage of the DREAM Act could 
have a significant impact on efforts to address the permanent 
ineligibility of unaccompanied alien children claiming false 
citizenship. 
The DREAM Act contained a provision giving the Secretary of 
Homeland Security discretionary authority to cancel removal of 
certain aliens and grant conditional nonimmigrant status.82  In 
order to be eligible for cancellation in this context, the alien must 
have met various statutory requirements, including an educational 
component.83  The DREAM Act included one provision of 
particular importance to this discussion: a waiver for section 
212(a)(6)—the umbrella provision which contains the ground of 
inadmissibility for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship.84  This waiver 
made it possible for minors who have falsely claimed U.S. 
citizenship to at least apply for the benefits afforded under the Act 
rather than face a permanent bar to U.S. immigration benefits. 
 
 
 
 
 
357, 396 (2006) (citing 151 Cong. Rec. S146, S304 (2005) (statement of Sen. 
Dianne Feinstein)) (discussing the arrest and detention of unaccompanied 
immigrant children in the United States). 
 79. H.R. 5281, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010). 
 80. See id. § 6(a). 
 81. For a list of major actions on the DREAM Act see H.R. 5281, 111th Cong. 
(2d Sess. 2010), available at http://thomas.gov/home/LegislativeData.php (select 
111th Congress, then search “H.R. 5281”). 
 82. Id.  The opportunity to adjust to conditional nonimmigrant status appears 
to be available only in the context of removal proceedings.  See id. § 6 (allowing 
cancellation of removal and granting conditional nonimmigrant status).  Thus, to 
gain such status, qualified aliens would have to enter removal proceedings to be 
able to apply. 
 83. Id. § 6(a)(1)(D). 
 84. Id. § 6(a)(2) (allowing the secretary of Homeland Security to waive 
misrepresentations under § 212(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2006))). 
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The initial period of conditional nonimmigrant status was five 
years85 and, provided certain additional requirements were met, 
might have been extended for a second period of five years.86  
Upon completing a ten-year period, conditional nonimmigrants 
may file an application to adjust their status to that of LPR.87  
Cancellation of removal combined with granting conditional 
nonimmigrant status could have been one of the few, if not only, 
routes around the permanent bar to permanent legal status for 
some inadmissible aliens. 
Despite the DREAM Act’s failure in the Senate, it once again 
demonstrates congressional recognition that, in certain instances, 
the current immigration system may produce harsh results that 
necessitate a legislative response.  Congress is unlikely to take up 
the DREAM Act in the next session;88 however, enacting the 
DREAM Act or a similar bill in the future could significantly impact 
the status quo for certain unaccompanied alien children deemed 
inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii). 
This legislative trend indicates increasing concern for 
unaccompanied alien children in terms of detention and custody.  
While this is a step in the right direction, legislative actions have 
thus far fallen short of adequately protecting unaccompanied alien 
children who face permanent and serious consequences for 
mistakes made before reaching adulthood. 
IV. MINNESOTA TACKLES FALSE CLAIMS BY AN UNACCOMPANIED 
ALIEN CHILD 
The Eighth Circuit recently heard oral arguments in a 
Minnesota immigration case involving a false claim to citizenship 
made by an unaccompanied alien child.89 
 
 
 85. Id. § 7(a). 
 86. Id. § 7(d).  While granting the initial period of conditional nonimmigrant 
status is discretionary, the second period appears to be mandatory, provided the 
statutory requirements are met.  Compare id. § 6(a)(1)(“Secretary of Homeland 
Security may cancel removal . . . .”), with id. § 7(d)(1) (“Secretary of Homeland 
security shall extend conditional nonimmigrant status . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 87. Id. § 8(c). 
 88. Shankar Vedantam, Next Congress Unlikely to Pass DREAM Act, Republicans Say, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2010, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/23/AR2010122305377_pf.html. 
 89. Oral Argument, Sandoval v. Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-3600), 
available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/oralargs/oaFrame.html. 
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In 1998, the sixteen-year old respondent attempted to enter 
the country from Mexico by presenting her sister’s birth certificate 
to immigration officials at the airport.90  The respondent admitted 
her real identity only after being presented with evidence 
demonstrating she was not the true owner of the birth certificate.91 
A decade later, despite qualifying for an immediate relative 
visa through her U.S. citizen spouse, she was placed in removal 
proceedings as statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status and, 
thus, removable.92  DHS concluded she was ineligible for 
adjustment of status based on her false claim to citizenship made at 
age sixteen.93 
In the 2005 removal proceedings, the immigration judge in 
Bloomington, Minnesota held that minors categorically lack the 
legal capacity to make false claims under the INA and granted the 
respondent’s petition for adjustment of status.94  The judge 
referred to permanently barring the respondent from the United 
States for actions taken while an unaccompanied alien child as the 
“immigration equivalent of the death penalty.”95 
DHS promptly appealed the immigration judge’s 2005 
decision.96  On appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) 
rejected the judge’s interpretation in an unpublished opinion, 
stating simply, “We find no legal authority . . . for the Immigration 
Judge’s ‘bright line rule.’”97  On remand, the immigration judge 
 
 90. In re Sandoval, No. A29 303 178, 2007 WL 3301476 (B.I.A. Sept. 28, 2007).  
Both opinions issued by the BIA in this case (In re Sandoval, No. A29 303 178, 2007 
WL 3301476 (B.I.A. Sept. 28, 2007), and In re Sandoval, No. A029-303-178, 2009 
Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 5568 (B.I.A. Oct. 8, 2009)) are unpublished and are not 
relied on as official interpretations by the BIA. 
 91. Sandoval, 2009 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 5568, at *5. 
 92. Id. at *4; Oral Argument, Sandoval v. Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-
3600), supra note 89, at 0:46-1:21. 
 93. Oral Argument, Sandoval v. Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-3600), 
supra note 89, at 0:46-1:21.  
 94. See Sandoval, 2007 WL 3301476; Children Lack Capacity to Make False Claims 
or Misrepresentations, IJ Holds, 83 INTERPRETER RELEASES 775, 775–76 (2006).  The 
case records and briefs are sealed pending the resolution of the case. 
 95. Oral Argument, Sandoval v. Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-3600), 
supra note 89, at 7:46. 
 96. Sandoval, 2007 WL 3301476. 
 97. Id.  The BIA simply cited the judge’s lack of authority and did not explain 
its position in its two-paragraph, unpublished decision.  See id.  The panel of judges 
at the Eighth Circuit oral argument appeared concerned about what rule the BIA 
was promulgating.  After some confusion over what significance the BIA’s short 
opinion had, the court asked the government attorney, “Can you describe the 
BIA’s rule or holding in twenty words or less?”  Oral Argument, Sandoval v. 
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ruled the respondent had falsely claimed citizenship and, thus, was 
statutory ineligible to apply for adjustment.98  The BIA affirmed the 
decision and dismissed the respondent’s second appeal.99 
The respondent appealed the BIA’s second decision and the 
Eighth Circuit recently heard oral arguments on the case.100  At oral 
argument, DHS asserted the respondent knew what she was doing 
at the time was wrong and that she was old enough to appreciate 
her actions.101  DHS further argued she had not timely retracted 
her false claim since she did not admit her real identity until 
presented with evidence of the underlying misrepresentation.102  
The respondent asked the court to interpret the false claims 
provision in a manner consistent with Congress’ otherwise 
protective treatment of minors elsewhere in the INA by 
categorically excluding minors.103  At the very least, the respondent 
asked the court to remand the case to the BIA so it could issue a 
formal decision.104 
V. UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN LACK LEGAL CAPACITY TO 
FALSELY CLAIM CITIZENSHIP 
Categorically excluding unaccompanied alien children from 
being found permanently inadmissible to the United States is 
consistent with the treatment of minors under other provisions of 
the INA.105  Minors are prohibited from seeking most benefits 
 
Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-3600), supra note 89, at 19:51-22:47. 
 98. In re Sandoval, No. A029-303-178, 2009 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 5568, at *4 
(B.I.A. Oct. 8, 2009). 
 99. Id. at *5–8. 
 100. Oral Argument, Sandoval v. Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-3600), 
supra note 89, at 0:46-1:21. 
 101. Id. at 14:11-15:58. 
 102. Id. at 16:01-17:41.  Timely retractions of false testimony or 
misrepresentations may overcome the permanent bar to relief for some aliens.  
Matter of M, 9 I. & N. Dec. 118, 118 (B.I.A. 1960).  An alien who “voluntarily and 
without prior exposure of his false testimony comes forward and corrects his 
testimony” may be considered to have timely retracted the false statement.  Id. at 
119. 
 103. Oral Argument, Sandoval v. Holder, 2011 WL 2314728 (No. 09-3600), 
supra note 89, at 0:46-1:21. 
 104. Id. at 10:41. 
 105. It should be noted that some consulates have made some exceptions for 
minors of various ages who have made false claims to citizenship.  Wheeler, Update 
from Ciudad Juarez, in 12-1 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 2 (2007).  Minors fifteen or 
younger may be found by the consulate to lack the mental capacity to falsely claim 
citizenship.  Id.  For minors age sixteen or seventeen, the consulate may look at 
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under the INA and are protected from some of the harshest 
consequences.106  The permanent and severe sting of the false 
claims provision, therefore, appears contrary to this broader 
protective treatment of unaccompanied alien children.  The 
following section addresses the process of statutory interpretation 
courts undertake when reviewing official agency decisions.  For the 
sake of argument, this section will proceed as if the BIA had issued 
a formal interpretation that section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) includes 
unaccompanied alien children. 
A. Statutory Interpretation Warrants Exempting Unaccompanied Alien 
Children 
When reviewing the official interpretations of the agency 
charged with implementing a statute, courts generally apply 
Chevron107 deference.108  Unofficial interpretations are given the 
lower Mead/Skidmore109 deference, in which agency decisions are 
only given their inherent persuasive value.110 
A Chevron analysis consists of two steps.  The first question is 
whether Congress has already addressed the specific issue and if its 
intent is clear.111  If so, the intent of Congress governs.112  Courts 
 
the surrounding circumstances and the child’s mental capacity to determine if an 
exception will apply.  Id.  A categorical approach, however, is preferred since it 
conforms to the ideals underlying the United States’ traditional treatment of 
minors in the juvenile and criminal systems.  See infra part VI.B. 
 106. See, e.g., INA § 349(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2006) (requiring a national to 
have achieved eighteen years of age before allowing many of the actions resulting 
in irrevocable renunciation of citizenship to take effect); INA § 351(b), 8 U.S.C. § 
1483(b) (allowing six months after attaining the age of eighteen for a national to 
assert claim to nationality and revoke any renunciation of such under § 349(a)(3) 
and (5) (8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3) and (5)) prior to eighteenth birthday); INA § 
334(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1445(b) (prohibiting application for naturalization by persons 
under the age of eighteen); 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) (requiring possession of, and 
punishing for failure to possess, registration card for aliens over the age of 
eighteen only). 
 107. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 108. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (discussing 
the deferential standard afforded official interpretations of the statutes the agency 
implements); Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995) (granting Chevron deference for 
permissible agency constructions of the statute). 
 109. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 218; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 110. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587–88 (2000) 
(declining Chevron deference to an agency interpretation which lacked the force 
of law); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 
257–58 (1991) (affording only persuasive value to the agency’s interpretation). 
 111. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
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should not evaluate the statutory provision in isolation, but rather 
evaluate it in the context of the statutory scheme.113  If Congress has 
not directly addressed the issue, or if the statute is silent, the 
second step is to evaluate whether the agency’s114 interpretation of 
the statute is permissible.115  Agency regulations created to fill gaps 
in the statute control unless they are “arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”116 
1. Section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) Is Arguably Ambiguous in Light of 
Other INA Provisions and Agency Regulations 
The false claims provision states, “Any alien who falsely 
represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to be a 
citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under this 
Act . . . or any other Federal or State law is inadmissible.”117  The 
plain language is silent on the provision’s application to 
unaccompanied alien children.  Congressional intent elsewhere in 
the INA demonstrates an overall concern for and protective 
treatment of minors, warranting a conclusion that the false claims 
provision is at least arguably ambiguous in light of the statutory 
scheme.118 
The next section demonstrates why an agency’s treatment of 
unaccompanied alien children under the false claims provision is 
arbitrary based on its departure from the INA’s broader protective 
treatment of minors. 
 
 112. Id. at 843. 
 113. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 
120, 132–33 (2000). 
 114. “Agency” will be used to reference the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ), Executive Office of 
Immigration Review (EOIR), the Department of Justice (DOJ), or any other 
government agency charged with implementing the INA or promulgating 
regulations to supplement the Act. 
 115. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 116. Id. at 844. 
 117. INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (2006). 
 118. See infra Part V.A.2.b. 
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2. Including Unaccompanied Alien Children Within 
212(a)(6)(C)(ii)’s Reach Is Contrary to the Statutory Scheme’s 
Protective Nature 
a. INA Provisions Support Special Treatment for 
Unaccompanied Alien Children 
A categorical exclusion of unaccompanied alien children from 
the harsh consequences of section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) finds support 
among other provisions of the INA.  A comprehensive reading of 
the INA demonstrates that minors are generally prohibited from 
independently seeking immigration benefits and are shielded from 
the harshest consequences. 
First, the INA authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to grant SIJ status on minors who have been declared dependent 
on a juvenile court or placed in the custody of a state agency, 
department, or court-appointed individual.119  SIJs are able to adjust 
status, even in spite of a false claim to citizenship, as section 
212(a)(6) does not apply to the determination of an SIJ’s 
admissibility.120 
An alien cannot file a valid application for naturalization until 
age eighteen.121  The only way for a minor alien to achieve 
citizenship is as a derivative of a parent’s application for 
citizenship.122  Interestingly though, minor aliens cannot petition 
for members of their family until age twenty-one.123  This imbalance 
creates a situation where minor aliens can only be included on a 
parent’s application and cannot file for their parent until age 
twenty-one.124  Additionally, minor aliens are prohibited from filing 
an affidavit of support for a sponsored alien until turning 
 
 119. INA § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). 
 120. See INA § 245(h)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2)(A). 
 121. INA § 334, 8 U.S.C. § 1445. 
 122. See id.; INA § 320, 8 U.S.C. § 1431 (discussing governing requirements for 
children born outside the United States to acquire citizenship); INA § 322(a), 8 
U.S.C. § 1433(a) (stating conditions for parents or grandparents applying for 
certificate of citizenship for the minor child). 
 123. See Faustino v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 302 F. Supp. 212, 214 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing to 8 U.S.C. § 1151); David B. Thronson, Thinking Small: The 
Need for Big Changes in Immigration Law’s Treatment of Children, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. 
L. & POL’Y 239, 253 (2010) [hereinafter Thronson, Thinking Small] (“Immigration 
law assimilates children’s status to that of their parents, but does not allow the 
assimilation of parents’ status to that of a child.”). 
 124. Thronson, Thinking Small, supra note 123, at 252–53 (discussing the INA’s 
effective subordination of children’s status to that of their parents). 
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eighteen.125  Thus, minor aliens lack the autonomy126 and legal 
capacity to seek U.S. citizenship for either themselves or their 
family members. 
Unaccompanied alien children receive special treatment in 
the asylum provision governing the one-year filing deadline.127  
Typically, an application for asylum must be filed within one year of 
arriving in the United States or the opportunity is lost.128  The 
statute allows for applications outside the one-year deadline due to 
“extraordinary circumstances” which caused the delay.129  Since the 
INA does not define “extraordinary circumstances,” DHS 
promulgated a non-exhaustive list of such circumstances.130  The 
regulation includes “legal disabilities” for which the applicant may 
be exempt from the one-year cutoff.131  Unaccompanied alien 
children, due to their legal disability of minority, fall within the 
exception to the one-year filing deadline as interpreted by the 
agency.132 
 
 125. INA § 213(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(f)(1)(B). 
 126. In many respects, minors are treated as subsets of their parents for 
immigration purposes.  For example, the BIA consistently imputes the parents’ 
state of mind to the child.  Senica v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 16 F.3d 
1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 1994) (imputing the mother’s failure to reasonably 
investigate her inadmissibility to her minor son).  The BIA has also imputed the 
parents’ abandonment of legal status to that of the minor.  In re Zamora, 17 I. & N. 
Dec. 395, 395 (B.I.A. 1980) (imputing the mother’s intent to abandon legal 
permanent residence status to the child, preventing re-entry to the United States). 
 127. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(ii) (2010) (exempting unaccompanied alien 
children from the one year filing deadline). 
 128. INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (requiring an alien to 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed 
within a year of arriving in the United States). 
 129. INA § 208(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (“[I]f the alien 
demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Attorney General . . . the existence of . . . 
extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within 
the period specified in subparagraph (B).”). 
 130. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Advocates have called for extending the legal disability exemption to all 
minors, arguing “[a]ll children suffer from a legal disability because of their 
minority.”  Lee Berger & Davina Figeroux, Protecting Unaccompanied Child Refugees 
from the One-Year Deadline: Minority as a Legal Disability, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 855, 857 
(2002) (urging that all children be exempted from the one year filing deadline in 
asylum cases).  In crafting the exemption, the agency relied on the definition of 
“legal incapacity” in reference to someone vested with a legal right but who is 
prevented from exercising it due to an impediment, citing minority as an example.  
Id. at 858 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 685 (5th ed. 1979)).  The definition 
relied on by the agency appears to include all minors, regardless of 
accompaniment.  Id. at 859. 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/7
  
1974 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:4 
The INA also protects minors from certain grounds of 
inadmissibility or deportability that normally would apply had an 
adult committed the offense.  Ordinarily, a crime involving moral 
turpitude (CIMT), which includes offenses such as theft, fraud, and 
lying, renders an alien either inadmissible or removable from the 
country.133  However, if the alien committed the CIMT before 
turning eighteen, the conviction does not make the minor 
inadmissible or removable.134  Likewise, juvenile delinquency 
adjudications are not considered “convictions” for purposes of the 
INA.135 
Recently, Congress provided further protections for 
unaccompanied alien children in the William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
(TVPRA).136  Section 235 of the TVPRA addresses increased efforts 
to prevent child trafficking.137  Several provisions pertain to 
protecting unaccompanied alien children.  First, immigration 
officials have discretion to allow an unaccompanied alien child who 
is deemed inadmissible at the border to withdraw his or her 
application for admission.138  Second, officials are directed to place 
unaccompanied alien children in removal rather than expedited 
 
 133. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (listing grounds 
for inadmissibility of aliens who have committed a CIMT); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (listing grounds for deportability for CIMTs). 
 134. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (exempting 
minors who have committed a CIMT from being found inadmissible).  The 
exception is limited to minors who have committed only one CIMT either five 
years before applying for a visa or when the maximum penalty possible was less 
than one year.  Id. at § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I)–
(II). 
 135. 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (2006); see In re Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362, 
1365 (B.I.A. 2000)(“We have consistently held that . . . acts of juvenile delinquency 
are not crimes, and that findings of juvenile delinquency are not convictions for 
immigration purposes.”); In re Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I. & N. Dec. 135, 137 (B.I.A. 
1981)(“It is settled that an act of juvenile delinquency is not a crime in the United 
States and that an adjudication of delinquency is not a conviction for a crime 
within the meaning of our immigration laws.”); In re De La Nues, 18 I. & N. Dec. 
140, 142 (B.I.A. 1981) (concluding a foreign conviction is not considered a crime 
for U.S. immigration laws if it “constitutes an act of juvenile delinquency under 
United States standards”).  Additionally, congressional records do not indicate an 
intention to include juvenile delinquency adjudications within the purview of INA 
section 101(a)(48)(A)’s definition of “conviction.”  Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
at 1369. 
 136. Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). 
 137. TVPRA § 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2010). 
 138. TVPRA § 1232(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(2)(B). 
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removal proceedings.139  Third, the Act transfers initial jurisdiction 
over asylum applications filed by unaccompanied alien children to 
the United States Immigration Citizenship and Immigration 
Service (USCIS) Asylum Division.140  As a result, unaccompanied 
alien children applying for asylum, even if already in removal 
proceedings, will have their cases reviewed by USCIS rather than an 
immigration judge.141  Finally, the Act calls for regulations that take 
into account the specialized needs of unaccompanied alien 
children142 and training for all staff working with such minors.143 
Thus, while section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) does not explicitly 
exclude minors from its reach, reading the false claims provision in 
reference to other sections provides support for modifying the way 
minors are treated under this ground of inadmissibility. 
b. Agency Policies and Regulations Contemplate Special 
Treatment of Unaccompanied Alien Children 
Agency policies and official guidelines also recognize the 
complicated situation presented by unaccompanied alien children 
in detention and immigration court.  Several regulations attempt to 
address the need for specialized treatment and modified 
procedures when dealing with unaccompanied alien children. 
The first area in which the agency seeks to differentiate 
between unaccompanied alien children and adults is detention.  
One of the greatest challenges is how to deal with unaccompanied 
alien children in immigration detention.144  The agency identifies 
its “paramount concern” as the minor’s welfare and emphasizes 
family reunification when possible.145  When release is not possible, 
agency regulations show a preference for home or shelter-care 
environment, with detention being the exception.146  At the very 
 
 139. See TVPRA § 1232(a)(5)(D)(i). 
 140. Id. § 235(d)(7)(B), 122 Stat. 5044, 5080–81 (2008). 
 141. See id.; USCIS Asylum Division Memorandum, supra note 20. 
 142. TVPRA § 235(d)(8), 122 Stat. at 5081. 
 143. Id. § 235(e), 122 Stat. at 5081. 
 144. Over the years, the number of unaccompanied alien children entering 
the country has risen dramatically.  The significant increase prompted the former 
Immigration and Naturalization Service to codify a uniform policy for dealing with 
unaccompanied alien children in exclusion and deportation proceedings.  
Detention and Release of Juveniles, 53 Fed. Reg. 17449-01 (May 17, 1988) 
(codified at 8 C.F.R. § 242.24 (1992)). 
 145. Id. at 17450 (“[R]eunification of the juvenile with his or her family is in 
the best interest of all concerned.”). 
 146. Id.  The preference for placing unaccompanied alien children in a shelter 
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least, the regulations suggest keeping unaccompanied alien 
children separate from the general adult detainee population.147 
Third, when a minor alien is the respondent in removal 
proceedings, agency policies suggest the immigration judge use 
“child sensitive procedures” in the courtroom.148  A child-sensitive 
approach in the courtroom includes measures such as allowing the 
child to explore the courtroom before the proceedings, bring a toy, 
sit next to a friend or adult companion, or allowing the judge to 
conduct the proceedings without the judicial robe.149  When 
possible, unaccompanied alien children should be assigned to a 
separate docket than adult immigrant detainees in removal 
proceedings.150  At a minimum, dockets should be scheduled to 
prevent forcing unaccompanied alien children to be transported 
with adult detainees.151 
Fourth, minors are not considered responsible for their rights 
and responsibilities with respect to preparing and appearing for 
final hearings at Immigration Court.152  The regulations require the 
 
environment rather than detention mirrors the Federal Juvenile Delinquency 
Act’s treatment of minors in custody pending juvenile delinquency adjudications.  
Id. at 17449. 
 147. Id. at 17451.  Despite the Flores settlement (see Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 
1352, 1354–57 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d sub nom, Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)) 
and agency promises for improving the conditions of detained minors, the 
requirements set out in Flores have largely been ignored.  See Nafziger, supra note 
78, at 379–85 (examining the conditions unaccompanied alien children face in 
detention settings).  Roughly eighty percent of unaccompanied alien children in 
secure facilities have not committed any criminal offenses.  Id. at 382.  Minors in 
such facilities are more likely to be strip-searched, shackled, and abused.  Id. at 
383.  Also in violation of the Flores Settlement, non-delinquent minors are often 
housed alongside adjudicated juvenile offenders.  Id.  Finally, unaccompanied 
alien children in such facilities are also subjected to solitary confinement.  Id.  
These examples all violate the Flores settlement’s mandate to hold minors in the 
“least restrictive setting.”  Id. at 384. 
 148. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge Memorandum, supra note 20, at 3; 
see Mejilla-Romero v. Holder, 614 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 2010) (remanding case to BIA 
to re-evaluate case record in light of child-sensitive guidelines). 
 149. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge Memorandum, supra note 20, at 4–
5.  Other suggestions include changing tone and language choice when 
questioning minors in court, giving leniency to inconsistent statements by children 
when ascertaining credibility, and explaining the procedures before starting.  Id. 
at 4. 
 150. Id. at 5. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Flores-Chavez v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(interpreting the regulatory framework as contemplating “that no minor alien 
under age eighteen should be presumed responsible for understanding his rights 
and responsibilities in preparing for and appearing at final immigration 
23
Kosse: Note: Banishing Children: The Legal (In) Capacity of Unaccompanie
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011
  
2011] BANISHING CHILDREN 1977 
adult to whom the minor may be released to ensure the minor’s 
appearance at future hearings.153  Additionally, agency regulations 
require personal service of the hearing notice to both the minor, 
under age fourteen in this case, and to the adult to whom the 
minor is released from custody.154 
Finally, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have also promulgated 
regulations supplementing the INA.  In immigration court, the 
immigration judge cannot accept an admission of removability 
from an unaccompanied and unrepresented minor in removal 
proceedings.155  Courts have relied on such regulations in their 
decisions, explaining that “[t]he regulatory framework . . . 
contemplates that no minor alien under age eighteen should be 
presumed responsible for understanding his rights and 
responsibilities in preparing for and appearing at final immigration 
proceedings.”156  As such, unaccompanied alien children are 
presumed unable to appear in immigration court without an adult 
or representative.157 
 
 
 
 
 
proceedings”). 
 153. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3 (2010) (requiring the adult to whom the minor is 
released to ensure presence at future hearings). 
 154. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a(c)(2)(ii) (2010); Flores-Chavez, 362 F.3d at 1153 
(requiring service upon both the juvenile and the person to whom the regulations 
authorize the juvenile’s release). 
 155. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (“The immigration judge shall not accept an 
admission of removability from an unrepresented respondent who is . . . under the 
age of 18 and is not accompanied by an attorney or legal representative, a near 
relative, legal guardian, or friend . . . .”). 
 156. Flores-Chavez, 362 F.3d at 1157. 
 157. Id.  Additionally, admissions by unaccompanied alien children to border 
patrol during custodial interrogations have also been treated as suspect in removal 
proceedings.  See Davila-Bardales v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 27 F.3d 1, 
at 4 (1st Cir. 1994) (criticizing the BIA’s reliance on statements made by 
unaccompanied alien children to Border Patrol agents when similar statements in 
court would have lacked trustworthiness).  In Davila-Bardales, the court held that 
since minors lack the ability to appreciate the significance and consequences of 
Border Patrol interrogations, scrutiny of admissions made by minors should 
extend to the initial stages of the investigative process.  Id. at 4.  The court relied 
on the pre-1996 version of the regulation banning admissions of removability by 
minors.  See id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(b)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10 (2010) 
(replacing section 242.16(b)). 
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Some agency policies and guidelines are not mandatory 
instructions.158  Their promulgation, however, demonstrates the 
agencies’ acknowledgement that unaccompanied alien children 
may warrant different treatment than their adult counterparts. 
Thus, blanket treatment of all aliens under section 
212(a)(6)(C)(ii) may not be appropriate, especially when 
unaccompanied alien children are involved. 
Even if courts decline to interpret the BIA’s treatment of 
unaccompanied alien children under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) as 
inconsistent with the INA, the preceding arguments demonstrate 
ample need to legislatively resolve such discordant treatment of 
minors. 
B. Age as a Mitigating Factor in Juvenile and Criminal Courts 
1. The Advent of the Juvenile Court System 
The juvenile justice system is a primary example of the United 
States’ recognition that the misdeeds of juveniles should be 
handled differently than those of adults.  Juvenile courts developed 
as part of the progressive social movements of the late nineteenth 
century.159  Social reformers of the time believed juveniles were not 
responsible for their delinquent behavior.160  They based this belief 
on juveniles’ dependency on adults, underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility, and impaired ability to understand consequences.161  
As a result, juvenile courts more closely resembled social welfare 
institutions than adult criminal courts.162  Reformers, through 
juvenile courts, hoped to rehabilitate juvenile offenders into law-
abiding citizens.163 
 
 
 
 
 158. While the Foreign Affairs Manual “provides guidance for State 
Department officers, the Service is not bound by it.”  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INS 
INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL § 17.5 (2001). 
 159. Ira M. Schwartz et al., Nine Lives and Then Some: Why the Juvenile Court Does 
Not Roll Over and Die, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 534 (1998) (describing the 
origins of the juvenile court system and the reformers’ belief that juveniles, unlike 
adults, could more easily be reformed). 
 160. Id. at 535. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 534–35. 
 163. Id. 
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The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), passed in 
1938,164 defines “juvenile delinquency” as resulting from an act 
committed by an individual under eighteen that would be “a crime 
if committed by an adult . . . .”165  This distinction reflects the 
United States’ long-standing tradition of dealing with juvenile 
offenders differently than adults.166  One of the persistent 
justifications for addressing juvenile crime differently is “the hope 
that juveniles can be rechanneled into becoming law abiding 
citizens.”167  The protections afforded under the FJDA are not 
limited to juveniles with U.S. citizenship; the Act specifically applies 
to non-citizen juveniles as well.168  Thus, even when the juvenile in 
question is undocumented with parents living abroad, the 
government must still make reasonable efforts to notify the parents 
or, alternatively, the foreign consulate of the juvenile’s custody.169  
Additionally, the FDJA requires officials to bring juveniles before a 
magistrate judge as soon as possible or, at the latest, within a 
reasonable time period.170 
In addition to notice and arraignment requirements, the FJDA 
mandates housing alleged juvenile offenders in an appropriate 
juvenile facility in which they will not interact with adult offenders 
or already adjudicated juvenile delinquents.171  Like DHS 
guidelines, the FJDA urges that juveniles be placed in a foster home 
or community-based facility when possible.172 
 
 
 164. Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938, ch. 486, §§ 1–9, 52 Stat. 764-66 
(1938) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–42 (2006)). 
 165. 18 U.S.C. § 5031. 
 166. See S. REP. NO. 93-1011, at 5290 (1974). 
 167. Id. 
 168. United States v. Doe, 862 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1988).  The court 
explained that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA) was enacted to 
protect the due process rights of juveniles.  Such protection, however, is not 
“coextensive with constitutional guarantees.”  Id. at 783 (Wallace, J., concurring in 
part). 
 169. Id. at 779–80.  The court ultimately remanded the case for failure to 
notify the parents or the Mexican consulate and for an unreasonable delay in 
arraigning the juvenile.  Id. at 781. 
 170. 18 U.S.C. § 5033; Doe, 862 F.2d at 780 (explaining under what 
circumstances a delay of thirty-six hours before arraignment would be considered 
reasonable under the FDJA.). 
 171. 18 U.S.C. § 5035. 
 172. See id.  The Act requires that juveniles be given adequate heat, food, 
water, and recreational opportunities in whatever facility they have been placed.  
Id. 
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U.S. law recognizes that minors are in a special category of the 
population.  The juvenile system considers age as a mitigating 
factor in punishing offenders.173  The recognition of minors’ 
inexperience, immaturity, and vulnerability is also found in the 
immigration system to a limited extent.  However, provisions that 
address the situation of minors fall short of the protection 
necessary to adequately protect the interests of unaccompanied 
alien children in the U.S. immigration system. 
2. Juveniles Exempted from Harshest Penalties in Criminal Courts 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long “recognized that the status 
of minors under the law is unique. . . .”174  Thus, for juveniles who 
go through the criminal courts, rather than the juvenile system, 
their age and immaturity may still be limiting factors protecting 
them from the most severe sentences.175  The Supreme Court has 
employed categorical rules in two decisions shielding juvenile 
offenders from the two most severe penalties available in criminal 
law: the death penalty and a life sentence without parole. 
a. Juveniles Are Categorically Ineligible for the Death Penalty 
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court drew the line for death penalty 
eligibility at age eighteen.176  The Court explained, “[T]he reasons 
why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities 
of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as 
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”177  The Court reasoned 
 
 173. See Schwartz et al., supra note 159 (charting the juvenile court’s historical 
focus on rehabilitation of juveniles). 
 174. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979). 
 175. See id. at 634–40 (discussing the reasons the rights of children are not 
identical to those of adults). 
 176. 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (expanding Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 
(1988)).  Prior to the Roper decision, the Supreme Court categorically excluded 
another group of individuals from the death penalty.  In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 321 (2002), the Court concluded that subjecting mentally retarded 
defendants to the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment under 
the Eighth Amendment.  The Court reasoned defendants’ mental deficiencies “do 
not warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their 
personal culpability.”  Id. at 318.  The justifications behind the death penalty, 
mainly retribution and deterrence, do not apply when the defendant cannot 
mentally appreciate his or her actions.  Id. at 319.  More importantly, the risk that 
the death penalty would be imposed regardless of the mitigating factors presented 
an especially grave potential for the Court.  Id. at 320. 
 177. Roper, 543 U.S. at 561 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835). 
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an offender should not be eligible for the most severe sanction 
until reaching the age at which American society recognizes 
adulthood.178 
The Court cited three rationales justifying its categorical line-
drawing.  First, youth generally lack the maturity and responsibility 
found in adults that may lead to “impetuous and ill-considered 
actions and decisions” on the part of juveniles.179  Juveniles’ lack of 
maturity, the Court argues, is what prompts nearly every state to 
prohibit minors “from voting, serving on juries, or marrying 
without parental consent.”180  Second, minors are more affected by 
negative or peer pressure than their adult counterparts.181  Finally, 
a juvenile’s character is not as fully formed as that of an adult.182  
These reasons convinced the Court that allowing juveniles to be 
condemned to death violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.183 
Prior to Roper, the Supreme Court had laid the groundwork for 
avoiding the “uncritica[l] transfer[] [of legal theories] to [the] 
determination of a State’s duty towards children.”184  First, the 
Court noted that due to juveniles’ vulnerability, the State may 
modify its legal system when dealing with juveniles to account for 
the “needs [of juveniles] for ‘concern, . . . sympathy, and . . . 
paternal attention.’”185  Second, states may impose certain 
limitations on a juvenile’s right to make important decisions that 
carry “serious consequences.”186  This limitation reflects the belief 
that minors lack the necessary experience and judgment to avoid 
making decisions that will have harmful consequences.187  Finally, 
the state may require parental consent for certain decisions to 
protect juveniles from adverse consequences or “their own 
immaturity.”188  Applying unmodified legal principles to juveniles 
 
 178. Id. at 574 (“The age of 18 is . . . where society draws the line . . . between 
childhood and adulthood.  It is . . . the age at which the line for death eligibility 
ought to rest.”). 
 179. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 570. 
 183. Id. at 578. 
 184. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633–34 (1979) (quoting May v. Anderson, 
345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953)). 
 185. Id. at 635 (quoting McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971)). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 637. 
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appears incompatible with protective measures taken by courts and 
states. 
b. Juveniles Are Categorically Exempted from Life in Prison 
Without Parole 
A recent Supreme Court decision broadened the protective 
treatment of juvenile offenders charged as adults in criminal 
courts.  In Graham v. Florida,189 the Supreme Court again employed 
a categorical rule to prevent courts from imposing a life sentence 
in prison without the possibility of parole on non-homicide juvenile 
offenders.190  In its decision, the Court wrote: “Categorical rules 
tend to be imperfect, but one is necessary here.”191 
The Court’s concern over the possibility of injustice with a 
case-by-case approach greatly informed the decision.192  In 
particular, the Court focused on the special problems attorneys 
may face in representing juvenile offenders.  The Court noted that 
juveniles tend to mistrust adults and do not fully understand the 
criminal justice system.193  As such, they are less likely to assist 
counsel with their own defense.194  A categorical rule, the Court 
argues, is more likely to remedy such difficulties.195 
More importantly, the Court wrote, “a categorical rule gives all 
juvenile nonhomicide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity 
and reform.”196  The Court found sentencing juveniles to a life 
without hope of “fulfillment outside prison walls” and “no chance 
for reconciliation with society” too harsh to allow.197 
 
 189. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).  Prior to the Graham decision, the United States 
was one of only two countries—the other being Somalia—that had not ratified the 
Convention on Rights of the Child of 1989, which forbids sentencing juveniles to 
life in prison without parole.  Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing 
Our Children to Die in Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 1009 
(2008) (“The CRC . . . codifies an international customary norm of human rights 
that forbids the sentencing of child offenders to [life in prison without parole].”).  
Although life in prison without parole is the harshest penalty available next to the 
death penalty, critics argue it is “effectively a death sentence carried out by the 
state over a long period of time.”  Id. at 984. 
 190. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032–34. 
 191. Id. at 2030. 
 192. See id. at 2031–33. 
 193. Id. at 2032. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 2032–33. 
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Many of the same concerns that have prompted the Supreme 
Court over the years to protect juvenile offenders from the harshest 
consequences are also found in the immigration context.  The 
Graham decision is especially compelling since a case-by-case 
analysis for unaccompanied alien children presents concerns 
similar to those that convinced the Court to craft a categorical rule 
in that case. 
Like sentencing juveniles to life in prison without parole, 
permanently barring unaccompanied alien children from the 
United States destroys all hope of reuniting with family in the 
country.  A categorical rule excluding unaccompanied alien 
children from the false claims provision allows the minor some 
hope of returning to the United States with legal status at some 
point in his or her life. 
Recognizing the need to be flexible in responding to the 
offenses of minors is not a new concept in the United States.  
Extending this understanding into the realm of immigration does 
not give unaccompanied alien children a free pass to disregard the 
laws of the country without consequences.  It does, however, 
prevent the door to legal status in the United States from being 
permanently closed to these individuals based on acts committed at 
the age when even U.S. citizens cannot fully participate in society. 
VI. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS 
Policy reasons support recognizing the unique and vulnerable 
situation in which unaccompanied alien children may find 
themselves. 
First, international law principles warrant affording better 
protections to unaccompanied alien children.  The Convention on 
Rights of the Child of 1989 (CRC) mandates a new child-centered 
perspective when dealing with children.198  The CRC’s preamble 
 
 198. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the 
Child], available at 1989 WL 503756.  Within two years of its adoption, over one 
hundred parties had ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
and by 1997, 191 parties had ratified.  Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer 
the Children?: A Call for United States Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 164 (2006) (outlining the basic 
components of the CRC as provisional, protective, and participatory rights).  
Proponents of the CRC claim it “revolutionized the . . . approach to children, 
turning them from family possessions into individual agents, from objects into 
subjects . . . .”  Jacqueline Bhaba & Wendy Young, Not Adults in Miniature: 
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quotes the Universal Declaration’s assertion that “childhood is 
entitled to special care and assistance . . . .”199  Signatories to the 
CRC are required to protect children and provide them with 
adequate care.200  While the United States has not ratified the 
CRC,201 the international community has demonstrated its concern 
for the rights of children. 
Second, “[u]naccompanied alien children represent the 
intersection of three” populations historically denied full 
protection in the United States—aliens in general, aliens without 
lawful status, and minors.202  The experiences of these 
“[u]nenviable [h]ybrid[s]”203 seldom inform the discussion on 
immigration law in any meaningful way.204  As such, lawmakers 
should be careful to include protective measures that reflect the 
reality faced by such individuals. 
 
 
 
Unaccompanied Child Asylum Seekers and the New U.S. Guidelines, 11 INT’L J. REFUGEE 
L. 84, 93 (1999) (discussing the importance of the CRC’s child-centered approach 
to children’s asylum claims). 
 199. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 198; Rutkow & 
Lozman, supra note 198, at 165. 
 200. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 198; Danuta Villarreal, 
To Protect the Defenseless: The Need for Child-Specific Substantive Standards for 
Unaccompanied Minor Asylum-Seekers, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 743, 757 (2004) 
(explaining that the CRC uses a “child-centered perspective” for safeguarding 
children’s rights). 
 201. Opponents to U.S. ratification cite concerns over sovereignty, federalism, 
family planning, and parental rights as reasons the United States has not ratified 
the CRC.  Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 198, at 173–80 (“As a direct result of 
these concerns . . . opponents of the treaty’s ratification introduced bills in the 
House and Senate . . . to ‘protect the fundamental right of a parent to direct the 
upbringing of a child . . . .’”).  They argue it interferes with parental rights in a way 
that threatens “fundamental family relationships.”  Id. at 179. 
 202. Corneal, supra note 17, at 617  (“[D]etermining the rights of 
unaccompanied alien children under U.S. law is a complex task requiring an 
examination of immigration law broadly, domestic law as it pertains to children, 
and the intersection of the two.”). 
 203. Id. at 625. 
 204. See id. at 656.  Commentators have called for including children’s 
perspectives in the discussion surrounding immigration policies in order to better 
protect immigrant children.  Id.  For further discussion of children’s rights in the 
immigration system see Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids, supra note 17, at 980 (“[L]ife-
altering determinations in immigration matters routinely are reached without 
consideration of the voices and viewpoints of children who are directly involved.”). 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Several potential approaches to the false claims provision 
could drastically improve the situation for unaccompanied alien 
children.  The following recommendations do not deviate from or 
unreasonably stretch current laws; instead, as demonstrated in 
previous sections, they fall within well-established boundaries of 
existing law in the United States.205 
First, the courts could interpret section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) to 
categorically exclude unaccompanied alien children from its scope.  
The INA and agency regulations present ample examples of 
specialized treatment for unaccompanied alien children that make 
little sense when compared to the severe penalties imposed for 
false claims to citizenship.206 
Second, if courts cannot interpret the INA to exclude 
unaccompanied alien children, a legislative amendment could 
explicitly exclude unaccompanied alien children from being 
permanently barred under the INA.207  The legislature has 
demonstrated its concern for minor aliens over the years and has 
previously excluded them from severe penalties in the INA.208  The 
 
 205. See supra Part V (discussing existing INA provisions, regulations, and 
criminal court decisions). 
 206. See supra Parts V.B, V.C. 
 207. Advocates for reforming the asylum provisions cite a congressional 
mandate as a preferred option.  Villarreal, supra note 200, at 772–73 (arguing 
Congress is the appropriate forum for substantive changes to asylum procedures 
for unaccompanied alien children given the deference it receives in the 
immigration arena).  Since the earliest days of immigration laws, courts have 
deferred to Congress’ plenary power in enacting immigration regulations.  Id. at 
772.  Congress is considered the “appropriate forum” for proposing such changes 
since it presents the best opportunity to fully evaluate and debate the merits of 
reforms.  Id. at 772–73.  An advantage to the legislative route for asylum reform is 
that “Congress could . . . consider whether amending the Immigration and 
Nationality Act ‘would further the humanitarian policy reasons underpinning 
grant of asylum.’”  Id. at 773 (citations omitted).  A congressional mandate 
exempting unaccompanied alien children from section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) would 
likewise allow for comprehensive debate, investigation, and be afforded deference 
by the courts.  See id. at 772–73. 
 208. See, e.g., Child Citizenship Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 
(2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.) (providing 
protection from findings of bad moral character, unlawful voting charges, and 
allegations of falsely claiming citizenship if certain criteria are met); 
Unaccompanied Alien Child Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1172, 109th Cong. 
(2005) (proposing procedural safeguards to protect unaccompanied alien 
children). 
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Child Citizenship Act of 2000 and DREAM Act of 2010 are just a 
few examples of laws Congress can use to lessen the sting of the 
permanent bar.209  A legislative amendment would ensure 
uniformity in the treatment of unaccompanied alien children 
under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) and prevent injustices that might 
arise from case-by-case treatment.210  In this regard, a legislative 
amendment may be the ideal option for addressing section 
212(a)(6)(C)(ii)’s harsh results. 
A third option is to statutorily create a waiver for 
unaccompanied alien children who falsely claim citizenship.  The 
legislature could extend the waiver available for misrepresentations 
under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) to include false claims to 
citizenship.211  This option would be less protective of minors’ rights 
but would at least remove the sting of the automatic permanent 
bar. 
Finally, courts could treat false claims by unaccompanied alien 
children as automatically retracted if made before being in the 
presence of a guardian or legal guardian.212  As unaccompanied 
alien children are not presumed to be responsible during removal 
proceedings, the same minors should not be presumed capable of 
making a rational decision to expose the false claim before 
evidence of it surfaces.  Their inability to make decisions in their 
best interests via cost-benefit analyses should not determine their 
inadmissibility for the rest of their lives. 
 
 
 209. See supra Part III.B (discussing historical amendments to the INA). 
 210. The Supreme Court’s concern over potential injustices from a case-by-
case analysis has prompted it to promulgate categorical rules excluding minors 
and mentally retarded defendants from the most severe penalties in criminal 
court.  See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding non-homicidal 
juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life in prison without parole); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (excluding juveniles from death penalty eligibility); 
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (concluding mentally retarded defendants 
are not eligible for the death penalty).  In the Roper decision, the Court’s 
categorical rule stemmed from the concern that a gruesome crime could 
overpower mitigating factors that may warrant a lesser sentence on the juvenile.  
543 U.S. at 573.  Such potential represented an “unacceptable likelihood” for the 
Court.  Id. 
 211. See INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (2006). 
 212. Agency regulations supplementing other provisions prevent 
unaccompanied alien children from taking actions adverse to their interests.  See, 
e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (2010) (preventing unaccompanied alien children from 
admitting removability in immigration court without an attorney or guardian 
present). 
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Any one of these recommendations could significantly 
improve the situation for unaccompanied alien children who make 
false claims to citizenship.  Recognizing the unique situation 
unaccompanied alien children are in does not sanction ignoring 
U.S. immigration laws.  Even if such measures are implemented, 
unaccompanied alien children who make false claims would not be 
receiving a free pass into the country.213  Such minors would still be 
required to demonstrate they are otherwise admissible and that 
they have a legal avenue for being in the United States.214  More 
lenient measures would, however, prevent the door to legal 
immigration to the United States from being forever closed and 
dead-bolted for mistakes made while legally a child. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Unaccompanied alien children comprise one of the most 
disadvantaged populations to go through the U.S. immigration 
system.  Despite their disadvantaged position, they are afforded 
only a few protections modified to adequately address their 
situation.  Permanently barring unaccompanied alien children 
from seeking legal status in the United States hardly seems 
compatible with Lady Liberty’s welcoming decree or the INA’s 
broader statutory treatment of such minors. 
Section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the INA should exclude 
unaccompanied alien children from the sting of permanent 
inadmissibility for falsely claiming citizenship.  Such an exemption 
upholds the United States’ tradition of modifying legal processes to 
account for the immaturity and unique needs of minors.  
Excluding unaccompanied alien children from the permanent bar 
 
 213. In fact, creating a non-immigrant visa category for unaccompanied alien 
children has been largely criticized.  See Carolyn J. Seugling, Toward a 
Comprehensive Response to the Transnational Migration of Unaccompanied Minors in the 
United States, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 861, 889 (2004) (“[F]amily reunification 
and unity has been a longstanding goal of immigration policy, and statutory 
provisions should not be created that would thwart this policy which is in the best 
interest of the child”).  One side effect of such a status could be encouraging 
families to separate if they believed sending their child to the United States would 
be in the child’s best interests.  Id.  The potential negative effects of such a visa, 
not to mention the ensuing political firestorm, indicate other options may be 
preferable in this situation.  See id. 
 214. See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (describing grounds of 
inadmissibility); INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (explaining requirements for 
adjustment of status). 
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to citizenship is also justified when looking at the INA as a whole.  
This protection should extend to inadmissibility based on false 
claims to citizenship.  Unaccompanied alien children, legally 
children by U.S. standards, should not be permanently barred from 
all legal avenues into the United States based on childhood 
mistakes. 
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